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PUTTING BITE IN NEPA'S BARK: NEW COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REGULATIONS
FOR THE PREPARATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS

In response to increasing concern over the nation's environment and heightened legislative awareness of the dangers of unbridled technological advancement, 1 Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 2 Through
NEPA, Congress hoped to spawn increased administrative concern for the environment by expressing substantive policies 3
which became part of the mandates of every federal agency• and
' See E. D01..GIN & T. GUILBERT, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 433, 438 (1974). See also
HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRONAlrrICS, INQUIRIES, LEGISLATION, POLICY STUDIES RE:
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITI'EE ON SCIENCE,
RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRONAlrrICS, MANAGING
THE ENVIRONMENT 5-6 (1968); Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and
the Congress, 68 M1cH.L.REv. 1073, 1074 (1970): "A new concern for values which cannot
easily be translated into the language of the market place can be felt and seen in citizen
efforts to save open spaces, parks, and natural beauty from poorly planned construction
of freeways, reservoirs, and industrial plants." For a brief but revealing discussion of the
various factors that led Congress to adopt a "national environmental policy," see R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 2-3 (1976).
Congress' concern about technological growth was aptly stated by Senator Jackson:
We have, however, paid a price for our progress, and our prosperity. We have
paid in the form of sluggish, rubbish laden rivers, air which is fouled with
smoke and poisoned by chemicals, wasted forests and stripmined lands, extinct
species of wildlife, haphazard growth of urban areas and transportation systems,
increased congestion in our cities, and intolerable noise levels.
Jackson, supra at 1073.
Efforts to gain congressional recognition of the problems presented by our deteriorating
environment were not immediately successful. Prior to NEPA, several bills stressing environmental concerns were introduced. Among these were the Resources and Conservation Act, S. 2549, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1969), and the Ecological Research and Surveys
Act, S. 2282, 89t}l Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). For a discussion of the movement supporting
environmental legislation in the 1960's, see R. Shelton, The Environmental Era: A
Chronological Guide to Policy and Concepts, 1962-72 (1973) (unpublished dissertation,
Cornell University Library, Ithaca, N.Y.).
• Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321-4361 (1976)).
•. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [hereinafter cited as NEPA], §§ 101102(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332(1) (1976), setting out Congress' goals for environmental
protection and providing that "to the fullest extent possible: . . . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies" of NEPA. NEPA, § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
' As used in this article, "agency" applies to both independent regulatory bodies and
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establishing procedures for implementing those policies. 5 Many
of those who had hoped that NEPA would help arrest or control
the degradation of the environment feel, however, that the
NEPA process has not met their expectations. 6
One of Congress' primary goals in passing NEPA was to make
agency decisionmakers aware of future demand for our nation's
natural resources. The procedural provisions of the Act were intended to promote that objective. Until recently, however,
NEPA has primarily provided environmentalists and non-environmentalists alike a tool with which to delay federal projects by
challenging the adequacy of enviromental impact statements. 7
The Act has enabled the former group to forestall, but rarely
prevent, interference with the earth's ecological balance8 and enabled the latter to achieve short-term non-environmental ends.'
The NEPA process must do more if the realignment of national
policies that the Act purports to achieve• 0 is to be realized.
Two commentators have described NEPA and its most notable
requirement, the preparation of environmental impact stateparts of the executive branch.
• NEPA, § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976). The most important provision of §
102(2) is § 102(2)(C), which requires the preparation of what has come to be called an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Political forecasters were uncertain what impact the Act would have upon the workings
of the federal government. Since 1969, the ramifications of NEPA have been reviewed
,and assessed periodically by commentators, see, e.g., F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS
(1973), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), see, e.g., CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL
QuALITY-1978, an annual report discussing the year's developments in environmental
fields, and Congress, see, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DMSION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS
(1973).
• See Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Working, How It
Should Work, [1974] 4 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10003; Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About
NEPA, 26 OKL. L. REv. 239 (1973). In this article, the phrase "NEPA process" will refer
to the fulfillment of the Act's procedural requirements in light of its substantive policies.
7
R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 158-60.
' See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The Court upheld the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
informal rulemaking procedures for determining environmental effects of fuel reprocessing. Despite the Court's holding, the Vermont Yankee litigation lasted four years and
thus forestalled the environmental damage feared by the public interest plaintiffs. See
also note 51 supra.
' See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 455
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (NEPA applicable to termination of federal helium conservation contract). Though the government contract in question was ultimately terminated,
the government purchased $30 million worth of unwanted helium during the litigation.
Wall St. J., June 9, 1978, at 25, col. 3. See also Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v.
Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975) (injunction sought by area residents against proposed
low income housing project, claiming inadequacy of EIS prepared by Department of
Housing and Urban Development).
IO 42 u.s.c. § 4321 (1976).
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ments, as a "built in mechanism for leading the bureaucratic
horses to environmental waters." 11 To a great extent, however,
the federal government's shortcomings in implementing NEPA's
policies result from agency decisionmakers' failure to utilize information prepared pursuant to the Act in fomulating their
decisions.
NEPA, in its most potent form, could be a powerful tool for
controlling the threat that advanced technology poses to our environment.12 Today, improved technology also provides means to
control that threat} 3 If utilized properly, the EIS can provide an
avenue by which methods of environmental protection will be
implemented.
'
In a step toward utilizing the potential of EIS's, President
Carter ordered in May of 1977 that the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) promulgate regulations for the preparation
and use of EIS's which would be binding on federal agencies. 14 In
the resulting regulations, the CEQ has attempted to transform
the NEPA process so as to ensure the serious consideration of
environmental values currently lacking in federal
decisionmaking. 15
11 Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511, 515 (1972).
12 E. DOI.GIN &·T. GUILBERT, supra note 1, at 435. See also Technology Assessment Act
of 1972, 2 U.S.C. §§ 471-481 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976) .
.. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TEcHNOWGY: PROCESSES OF AssESSMENT AND CHOICE
11-12 (1969) ("[A]dvances in science and technology have brought advances in our ability
to anticipate the secondary and tertiary consequences of contemplated technological developments . . . . For the first time in human history [mankind can] realistically aspire
to have it both ways: to maximize our gains [from technology] while minimizing our
[environmental] losses.").
" Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977) (amending Exec. Order No.
11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970)). Prior to the President's call for action, CEQ published
a report which, contrary to its own statements in the supplementary materials accompanying its new guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, col. 2 (1978), and its ninth annual report,
CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY-1978, 396-97, reflected positively on the adjustment of
federal agencies to NEPA's requirements and the use of EIS's in decisionmaking. The
optimism portrayed in these materials is inconsistent with other authority on NEPA.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS-AN ANALYSIS
OF Six YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES (1976) (hereinafter cited as 1976
REPORT).
The new guidelines took effect on July 30, 1979. Prior to this time, CEQ's advisory
guidelines were in effect. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1-1500.14 (1978).
In the light of the acknowledgement in the statement accompanying Exec. Order No.
12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978), that the President may not be able to bind independent regulatory agencies, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,760 (1978), it is unclear whether CEQ or the
President have the authority so to bind independent federal agencies by these regulations. It should be noted that NEPA itself purports to apply to all federal agencies. 42
u.s.c. § 4332(2) (1976).
" In order to gain acceptance for its new guidelines, CEQ has attempted, to a great
extent, to respond to prior judicial interpretations of NEPA. Throughout this article, ref-
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This article will examine the new regulations to assess the
manner in which they will affect federal decisionmaking. Part I
briefly reviews the role the NEPA process has heretofore played
in agency decisionmaking and its potential for the future. Parts
II, III, and IV discuss specific provisions of the new regulations
which may profoundly affect the agencies. Part II examines those
sections of the regulations which seek to ensure that the EIS
contains the substantive information necessary to fulfill NEPA's
policies. Part III discusses significant procedural changes in the
environmental assessment process designed to insure that this
substantive information is considered by agency decisionmakers.
Part IV examines provisions which seek to guarantee that agency
decisions subsequent to the preparation of the EIS actually reflect the information it contains. The article concludes that
CEQ's initiative will greatly promote the policies of NEPA.

I. NEPA-PAST

AND

FUTURE

When NEPA was enacted it was hailed as a "window to the
outside world," 18 opening previously closed aspects of the administrative process to public scrutiny and comment, thus forcing
more considered and informed decisionmaking. The EIS was
viewed by many as the Act's most important feature. 17 In practice, however, NEPA procedures have not had a profound impact
upon agency decisionmaking. Two problems have plagued the
Act's effectiveness. First, while the procedural provisions of section 102(2) 18 are clearly binding on all federal agencies, and the
courts have rarely hestiated to order strict compliance with these
requirements, 19 judges have been reluctant to reverse agency deerences will be made to court decisions with which the new guidelines are in accord.
The requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1979), for example, echo the discussion of the
information required in an EIS in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524
F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding an EIS inadequate). The court there emphasized that
NEPA's requirement is broader than· the mere filing of an EIS and that the preparer of
the EIS must provide ample data and reasoning to enable a reader to evaluate the analysis and conclusions of the EIS. Id. at 93.
11
Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 516-17.
17
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 1079. ·
18 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Section 102(2)(C) contains NEPA's "action-forcing"
provision for the preparation of an EIS for "major federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." The statement, under the Act, must include (i)
the projected environmental impact of a proposed action, (ii) unavoidable adverse environmental impacts, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between
local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources associated with the proposed action. Id.
11 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
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cisions for failure to comport with the policy declarations of sections 101 and 102(1). 20 Second, when not under judicial scrutiny,
agencies have been recalcitrant in fulfilling the procedural obligations imposed by the Act. The latter problem prompted President Carter to order the promulgation of the new regulations. 21

A.

The Administrative Process and National Environmental
Policy

The policies set out in sections 101 and 102(1) of NEPA theoretically became part of the statutory mandate of each federal
agency; 22 thus, consideration of environmental protection should
enter into the deliberations of all federal agencies. Agencies,
however, have remained loyal to their original statutory missions23 in formulating decisions, becoming, in effect, part of the
environmental problem rather than part of its solution. 24 While
there has been pro forma compliance with the procedural requirements of section 102(2), information obtained through the
environmental assessment process has rarely been translated
into decisions which take account of national environmental pol1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the leading early case on NEPA.
,. See, e.g., Pye v. Dep't of Transportation, 513 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1975); Tanner
v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972). But see Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972).
21 President Carter intimated that he believes NEPA creates a substantive obligation
on the part of federal agencies when, in the authorization for the new guidelines, he
stated that the Act was legislative recognition of the need for decisionmakers "to focus on
real environmental issues." Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977). While his
assessment does not legally bind the agencies, it is of great political significance. The
general terms of the Act leave much room for executive interpretation. Thus, the views of
the President are likely to be quite influential in shaping the implementing regulations
which wed federal agencies to a particular interpretation of the Act.
12 NEPA, § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1976). The court in Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d
677, 689 (9th Cir. 1974), stressed that "(e]nvironmental protection is part of every federal
agency's mandate." NEPA, if faithfully followed, could diminish the "fragmentation of
. . . purposes and values among [the) disparate, mission oriented groups" in the federal
government. R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 5.
23
Andrews terms this problem one of "jurisdictional externalities," i.e., "values that ·
are neglected in administrative decisions because they .fell outside the jurisdiction of the
agency responsible for an action." R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 5.
i. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute For Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Atomic Energy Commission failed to prepare
EIS in connection with liquid metal fast breeder reactor program); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972) (court termed Secretary
of Transportation's action under NEPA as "mere token efforts."); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Secretary of the Interior
argued that discussion of alternatives mandated by NEPA did not have to include discussion of environmental impacts of such alternatives); Akers v. Resor, 443 F. Supp. 1355
(W.D. Tenn. 1978) (Corps of Engineers failed to discuss environmental impacts of flood
and drainage program in EIS).
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1c1es and goals. 25 Courts have repeatedly found it necessary to
remind agencies that an EIS may not be used to justify a decision formulated prior to its preparation. 26
The agencies' shunning of environmental values is a function
of two common features of the federal bureaucracy. First, agencies can be effective only if they can mobilize political support
for their legislatively created roles. 27 The federal bureaucracy operates on a reward system; it is dependent upon "political basis
for its survival and growth." 28 It is in an agency's interest to be
responsive to its most powerful constitutents, most often those
involved in industry and business, 29 thus retaining the support of
those constituents' lobbies.
Second, because agency action is ultimately that of the individuals who constitute the agency, an agency's reluctance to implement NEPA's substantive policies is due in part to the attitudes of those individuals. 30 While an abstract concept of the
"organization" does not control each choice of a decisionmaker,
it does provide the official with the values premises upon which
those choices are based. 31 The particular values imparted by a
federal agency to its personnel are an outgrowth of the mission it
was created to fulfill. This phenomenon is dictated by the educational background of the agency's staff members, 32 the relation11 Supplementary Information to Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, col. 2 (1978).
See generally E. DoLGIN & T. GUILBERT, supra note l, at 443-57.
" See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 276-79 (W.D. Wash. 1972) ("The environmental impact study may not 'be used as a promotional document in favor of the
proposal.'" Id. at 276 (footnote omitted)).
27 Long, Power and Administration, 9 Pus. AD. REv. 257 (1949), reprinted in BUREAU·
CRATIC PoWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 5, 8 (2d ed. F. Rourke, 1972).
ZS Id.
21 It has also been suggested that agencies may fail to respond to NEPA so as not to
alienate their congressional constituents whose interests are in non-environmental areas.
R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 82 (1976).
30
It has been suggested that bureaucrats' perspectives are molded by their individual
responses to the stimuli provided by the agency. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 123
(1957).
"Id.
"' Most agency personnel, even those involved with the preparation of EIS's, have narrow perspectives, Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 516; an agency's "professional staffs
normally included only the range of disciplines necessary to the fulfillment of [their] particular missions," R. ANDREWS, supra note l, at 4. See 1976 REPoRT, supra note 14, at 510, for a general discussion and data concerning agency NEPA offices.
One critic of agency efforts to comply with NEPA has pointed out that the traditional
mission-oriented agency does not have a staff qualified to prepare EIS's because its members are unfamiliar with environmental concerns and sciences. Strobehn, NEPA 's Impact
on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples of Non-Compliance and Suggestions for Change, 4
EcoL. L.Q. 93, 102 (1974); accord, 1976 RuoRT, supra note 14, at 11; cf. Frederickson,
Public Administration in the 1970's: Deuelopments and Directions, 36 Pus. Ao. REv. 564,
565 (1976) ("Most public servants . . . identify with some . . . professional field.").
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ships they develop with the agency's constituents, and their constant striving to perform the agency's statutory mission. 33 In the
context of NEPA, agency personnel resist implementing the
Act's policy declarations because these policies run counter to
the values that have been instilled in them by their agency. 34

B.

Stricter Enforcement of NEPA Through CEQ's New
Regulations

The focus of the CEQ's new regulations is on procedures to be
employed in preparing an EIS. Ultimately, however, it is not
better environmental documents, but decisions which take account of environmental values, that are important. 35 Procedural
reforms alone will not change the substantive direction of agency
policies38 if agencies continue to resist applying NEPA's precepts
to their decisions. 37 Combatting agency resistance is a difficult
task since the agencies are well insulated from outside influence.
The regulations can erode this insulation in three ways. First,
while the public has heretofore been a primary source of NEPA
The extensive requirements of the new regulations may cause agencies either to develop or acquire special personnel to prepare their EIS's. If the regulations do induce
agencies to hire staff members with greater environmental consciousness and analytic
expertise than those currently preparing EIS's, two changes could result. First, the quality of the information in EIS's might improve. Second, the agencies' perspective might be
broadened and their orientation might shift, causing greater consideration of and deference to environmental values. See Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 516.
13 One commentator described the nexus between NEPA and the identity of agency
mission, and agency staff orientation, stating that the Act was designed to enable agency
staff members to "overcome, through study and discussion, anti-environmental biases
resulting from inertia and ignorance." Comment, The National Environmental Policy
Act Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 EcoL. L.Q. 799, 816 (1973) .
.. The draft guidelines were not well received by federal agencies which, among other
things, felt they betrayed a lack of "appreciation of bureaucratic reality." Comment,
CEQ Proposes Ambitious Regulations for Comment, Stands Ground Despite Agency
Criticism, [1978) 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10129, 10130.
u 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(C) (1979) .
.. Comment, Reinvigorating the NEPA Process: CEQ's Draft Compliance Regulations
Stir Controversy, [1978) 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELR) 10045, 10046. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42
Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977), authorizing these guidelines, limits the authorization to "[issuing) regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions
of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2))." Id. (emphasis added). This raises the question of
whether the provisions of the guidelines which potentially have substantive impact are
within the ambit of the executive order. See parts II & IV infra.
17
It has been suggested that agencies can adapt themselves to changing social values
through internal reorganization in one of two ways-either by a change in agency structure, see F. MOSHER, GoVERNMENTAL REoRANIZATIONS: CASES AND COMMENTARY (1976), or a
change in agency personnel, Frederickson, supra note 32, at 565-66. One commentator
suggests that agencies may lack the resources required for such institutional reforms. R.
LIRoFF, supra note 29, at 83.
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enforcement, 38 certain provisions of the new regulations facilitate
even greater enforcement by the public as lobbyists as well as
litigants. 39 Second, until now, courts reviewing EIS's have been
restricted to applying the standard of review set out in section
706(2)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act.4° Courts will now
impose upon federal agencies the concrete requirements set forth
by CEQ. Third, while they remain capable of nullifying Congress' environmental mandate communicated through NEPA,
agency decisionmakers may become more amenable to accepting
the Act's precepts. The more often a decisionmaker is confronted
with the projections in an EIS and the subsequent realization of
those projections, the greater the probability that he or she will
begin to take greater heed of the document.
The new guidelines modify existing NEPA procedures in two
general ways. First, they particularize or alter procedures which
are generally followed by most agencies. Second, they add innovative procedures intended to improve EIS's and compel agencies to utilize them in decisionmaking. Frequently, provisions in
the latter category will have some basis in case law or literature,
though they are not presently common practice in most agencies.
38
See notes 183-205 and accompanying text infra. A Senate report concluded that,
through attempts to enforce NEPA in the courts, the public has been the most effective
champion of the environmental cause, the principal force driving NEPA's implementation. R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 154, citing S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
There have been various types of public organizations involved in NEPA litigation.
One such type consists of national or regional public interest organizations such as the
Sierra Club, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1970), and the Natural Resources Defense Council, NRDC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). Another
type includes local civic and environmental groups. Examples are 1.M.A.G.E. of Greater
San Antonio, Texas, Image v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978), and the Conservation
Society of Southern Vermont, Inc., Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transportation,
531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). Finally, some NEPA litigation has been initiated by groups
formed for the sole purpose of combatting a single government action. Such organizations
include the Stop H-3 Association, Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14 (D. Hawaii),
and Save Our Ten Acres, Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
While citizen suits have not altered many individual decisions, they have been instrumental in raising the environmental consciousness of agency staff members. Environmental protection statutes passed subsequent to NEPA have often specifically provided for
citizen suits. See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1977, § 129, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II
1978); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(1976); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 413, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1976); and Safe Drinking
Water Act, § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1976).
•• For example, through the record of decision, see part IV B infra, the public will be
afforded even greater access than previously to information concerning the agencies'
treatment of environmental values and thus an even better opportunity to challenge
agency actions which ignore environmental concerns.
•• 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). Judicial review of administrative determinations is generally limited to the standards in this section. Agency decisions are not normally reviewable de novo by the courts.

WINTER

II.

1980)

New CEQ Regulations

375

ASSURING THE INCLUSION OF SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION IN THE

EIS
The most essential step in attaining acceptance of environmental policies is to make certain that federal decisionmakers
are aware of the harm their agencies' actions may cause. Congress established the EIS to present decisionmakers with this information. On the whole, however, NEPA's description of the
substantive information to be included in an EIS is ambiguous
and disjointed." Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, which provides for
the preparation of an EIS for "all major federal actions significantly affecting the human environment," lists five general subjects to be addressed in the statement.•2 In addition, NEPA
mandates that all federal agencies consider (1) "the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts," 43 (2) "presently unquantified environmental amenities,"•• (3) "appropriate
alternatives to recommended courses of action," 45 and (4) "ecological information. " 48 Thus, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise
data which should be included in an EIS.
General interpretations of NEPA's requirements for the content of EIS's have been consistent. The prevailing judicial interpretation is that NEPA requires the information included in an
EIS to be of sufficient depth to provide the agency with a basis
" An effort to remedy the Act's skeletal treatment of this question was made in 1973
when Senator Weicker of Connecticut introduced a bill which, if it had been enacted,
would require that an EIS discuss:
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, together with the impact of the proposed action on the economic, social, and cultural dimensions
which contribute to the quality of the human environment,
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented, along with any opposing considerations of national
policy as set forth in Section 102(2)(B) which are used to justify implementation
of such proposal,
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action, including the reasons, environmental, social, or economic, for rejection of such alternatives,
(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action, should it be implemented, and that any such
commitments are warranted in terms of balancing policy considerations as set
forth in Section 102(2)(B).
S. 1668, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (proposed amendments to the Act are in italics).
" See note 18 supra.
" NEPA, § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1976).
" Id. § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976).
•• Id. § 102(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1976). A discussion of alternatives is also
required under NEPA, § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1976), as part of the
EIS. See part Il B infra.
" NEPA, § 102(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1976).
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for a reasoned decision.4 7 Courts, however, have been unable to
offer a comprehensive statement of the specific issues which
should be addressed in an EIS; they are generally confronted
with an EIS deficient in certain particulars but otherwise procedurally adequate. Similarly, no binding regulations, except those
prepared by individual agencies, have heretofore existed. 48
The new guidelines contain several provisions which attempt
to assure that all relevant and necessary information concerning
the environmental effects of major federal actions is evaluated
by decisionmakers.49 Some of these provisions enumerate, without much elaboration, items which are normally included in an
EIS. 50 Three provisions, however, stand out as particularly significant in precipitating greater adherence to NEPA's policies.

A.

Scoping

Due to the paucity of statutory guidance concerning the content of EIS's, agencies have repeatedly failed to discuss certain
relevant considerations while dealing with others that are insignificant concerning a particular project. The byproducts of such
breakdowns in planning have been excessive and protracted litigation, 51 unnecessary expenditure of agency resources, 52 and de47 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Morton, 458 F.Supp. 827, 836
(D.C.Cir. 1972).
48
See, e.g., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,182 (1973).
" For the purposes of this part, it will be assumed that the purely procedural sections
of the new guidelines, discussed in part ID infra, are followed, and that the EIS is available to decisionmakers at the appropriate stage in the decisionmaking process. In practice,
the EIS may not, however, be available until a later date. See notes· 110-24 and accompanying text infra .
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1979), for example, contains an exhaustive list of different impacts and resource requirements of a proposed action that must be discussed in an EIS.
The Council stated in its discussion of comments on the draft guidelines that the required analysis concerning costs and benefits related to exhaustion of energy resources is
intended to be extensive, Supplementary Information to Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978
at 55, 984, col. 1 (1978) (comments on § 1502.15).
0
• The volume of NEPA litigation was greatest in 1974 when 189 cases were filed. There
were at least one hundred NEPA suits filed through 1977. CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY1978 407-15. An example of a drawn out NEPA case is the litigation culminating with the
dismissal in Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
which lasted over four years, including the case of Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v.
Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and rem 'd, 523 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1975). See also note 8 supra.
sz CEQ recognized this problem prior to the President's Exec. Order No. 11,991. One of
the major conclusions of the 1976 REP<>RT, which was designed to determine the effectiveness of EIS's in improving decisionmaking, was that the CEQ and the agencies must
"extend efforts . . . to determine the appropriate scope of analysis" in EIS's. 1976 REPORT, supra note 14, at 4, 25.
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lay of important projects. To avert these problems, CEQ has developed provisions requiring interagency cooperation in pre-EIS
planning procedures. 53 One of these procedures is aimed at identifying, at an early stage, the information which is important in
evaluating a particular project. This process has been termed
"scoping. " 54
The regulations first provide that "there shall be an early and
open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed
in the EIS and for identifying the significant issues related to a
proposed action." 55 Scoping also includes specific planning for
the preparation of the EIS, 58 including allocating responsibility
for particular sections to the various agencies participating in its
preparation. 57 The lead agency58 is to invite federal, state, and
local agencies, any affected Indian tribe, the proponent of the
proposed action, and other interested parties to participate in
the scoping process. 59
One danger associated with interagency cooperation on a given
project is that the institutional biases of the various agencies
may only confuse the decisionmaker, who will be presented with
information from a variety of inconsistent perspectives. The
scoping requirement alleviates this problem to a great extent by
providing for an exchange of ideas prior to the preparation of the
EIS. This should enable lead and cooperating80 agencies to integrate and evaluate data developed by other agencies, being cognizant of the other agencies' priorities and what they view as the
primary benefits and dangers of the proposed action. 81
Objections have been raised concerning the time-consuming
13
One significant change that the new guidelines introduce into the NEPA process is a
formalized set of procedures for interagency cooperation in each step of the EIS preparation process. See part II C infra. The statutory language does not mandate the extensive
cooperation established by CEQ, but it implies that some cooperation should take place.
NEPA, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), states that the preparer of the EIS
"shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved" with
a proposed action. Apparently, the new guidelines' provisions for interagency cooperation
in EIS preparation are rooted in this sketchy statutory language. To effectively implement the Act, CEQ has required formal cooperation, not mere consultation.
" 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1979).
"Id.
11
Id. § 1501.7(a)(2)-(7) .
., Id. § 1501. 7(a)( 4).
51
See id. § 1501.5: "A lead agency shall supervise the preparation of an environmental
impact statement if more than one Federal agency [is involved in the proposed action]."
" Id. § 1501.7(a)(l).
'° See id. § 1501.6. A "cooperating agency" is any agency besides the lead agency
which is involved in preparing an EIS.
11
Alternatively, it is possible that one agency may improperly discount information
from another agency because of what it perceives are biases of that agency.
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nature of the scoping process. The CEQ, however, believes that
any disruption of the decisionmaking process will be insignificant and that scoping will sufficiently enhance the efficiency of
the NEPA process to justify the expenditure of time. 82 While administrative economy is a laudable objective, it should not become an ultimate goal, especially at the expense of comprehensive decisionmaking.
A potential flaw in the scoping technique is that it will cause a
cursory treatment of the issues by diffusing the energies available for EIS preparation. When agencies with divergent orientations debate which questions are relevant to a particular project,
their diverse backgrounds will· beget diverse priorities. Compromises could well produce an EIS addressing so many issues
that none can be developed adequately if the statement is to be
prepared in accordance with CEQ's page limitations. 83 It is also
possible, however, that scoping will result in an EIS which reflects the many values of a pluralistic society and which helps
reach decisions which do the same. In view of the adolescent
character of environmental sciences, a sacrifice of detail in exchange for broadened perspectives may be beneficial in the short
run if it serves to familiarize agencies with the nature and range
of environmental problems their actions might cause.
· It should be emphasized that environmental considerations
will not necessarily be accorded their due weight simply because
of interagency cooperation or because scoping ensures that the
EIS will contain the proper information. Such cooperation will,
however, permit those decisionmakers who are responsive to environmental concerns to protect the environment while achieving
other objectives by making necessary information available to
them. In sum, the formal organization and planning of EIS preparation through scoping will allow "more timely, coordinated,
and efficient review of (proposed actions)." 84

B.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

One clear NEPA requirement is that agencies must consider
alternatives to a proposed action, whether or not an EIS is pre12
Supplementary Information to Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,982, col.2
(1978).
13
"The text of final environmental statements . . . shall normally be less than 150
pages and for proposals of unusual scope or complexity shall normally be less than 300
pages." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7 (1979).
" Supplementary Information on Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,982, col. 1
(1978), comments on § 1501.7.
p
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pared. 85 The discussion of alternatives has been termed the
"heart" of the EIS" because it provides agency decisionmakers
with information about the environmental impacts of a range of
concrete avenues for achieving the agency's objective, rather
than merely revealing the environmental effects of the proposed
action.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 87 the
authoritative interpretation of the alternatives requirement, 88 the
court addressed three important aspects of the treatment of alternatives in an EIS: the range of alternatives discussed, the extent to which each alternative is evaluated, and the standard for
judicial review. Under Morton, the alternatives considered must
include the alternative of no action, 89 methods of achieving the
objective sought that are outside the jurisdiction of the agency
preparing the statement, 70 and methods which may not completely achieve that objective. 71 The discussion of each alternative must provide "information sufficient to permit a reasoned
choice [among] alternatives so far as the environmental effects
[of each] are concerned." 72 Finally, the case established a rule of
reason for determining whether an impact statement discusses
all appropriate alternatives to the proposed action. 73
The applicable CEQ regulations are consistent with judicial
interpretations of the alternatives requirement. 74 Section 1502.14
details the method for discussing alternatives in an· EIS. Generally, the agencies must "[r]igorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and . . . briefly discuss the
.. NEPA, §§ 102(2)(C)(iii), (E), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(iii), (E) (1976). Only §
102(2)(C) of NEPA applies to the preparation of EIS's. Thus, § 102(2)(E), along with the
other subsections of § 102(2), must be complied with in some form of environmental
assessment document whether or not § 102(2)(C) is triggered.
" 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1979).
" 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11
For '<ases citing Morton es the authoritative treatment of the issue of alternatives,
see Cummington Preservation Comm. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 524 F.2d 241, 244 (1st
Cir. 1975); Caroline Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 798
(D.C. Dir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (TennesseeTombigbee Waterway), 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conservation
Soc'y, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1972).
11
458 F. 2d at 834.
10
Id. at 834-35 .
. " Id. at 836.
" Id. at 836.
" Id. at 834.'
" 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1979). In promulgating § 1502.14, CEQ was evidently cognizant
of prior case law. See note 15 supra. The Council's concern that this part receive the
complete sanction of the courts is attributable to CEQ's view that this section is the most
important in the EIS. See text accompanying note 66 supra.

380

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:2

reasons [others] hav[e] been eliminated." 75 Each alternative
must be sufficiently detailed to allow decisionmakers to evaluate
its comparative merits. 78 The range of alternatives explored
should not be limited to those within the jurisdiction of the
agency preparing the EIS if options outside its jurisdiction are
viable, and must include the possibility that no action should be
taken. 77 Finally, the agency is to identify its preferred alternative
and include appropriate measures for mitigating environmental
harm that have not already been developed and included as part
of the proposed action or an alternative thereto. 78
Section 1502.14 of the regulations enhances decisionmaking in
several ways. First, treating all reasonable alternatives to a proposed action should facilitate better decisions. NEPA has been
interpreted to require agencies to balance the costs and benefits
of a proposed action in a "finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing analysis. " 79 Assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of a particular course of action should be affected by
the potential environmental harm from possible alternatives.
Thus, the best choice is more readily determined when all reasonable alternatives are examined in the EIS. 80
Second, the elaborate discussion of alternatives required by
sections 1502.14(a) and 1502.14(b) is important in assuring that
the decisionmaking process becomes "finely tuned." If agencies
do not develop data about alternatives as extensively as they do
for the original proposal, an adequate basis for comparison may
not exist. It is imperative that when any information is available
to decisionmakers concerning a proposed action, equivalent information about the possible alternative be provided as well.
Third, when a decisionmaker is provided with more comprehensive information on a given alternative than on others, the
decision could be prejudiced in favor of that alternative. If the
decisionmaker is better able to perceive the ultimate result of
more than one alternative he or she may be less likely to choose
a course of action with a more speculative impact. 81
75

40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1502.14(b).
77 Id. § 1502.14(c)-(d). While § 1502.14(c) refers specifically to the jurisdiction of the
lead agency, see note 59 supra, it is evidently the intention of CEQ that agencies beside
the lead agency be involved in the preparation of the EIS (see §§ 1501.5-1501.6). Thus, §
1502.14(c) will be discussed here as if the terms "lead" and "preparing" were
interchangeable.
1
• Id. § 1502.14(e)-(O.
71 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
80
Id. at 1114.
1
• See part II C infra.
71
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The requirements in sections 1502.14(c) and 1502.14(d) should
broaden the approach of agencies in considering alternatives.
The requirement of section 1502.14(c) that an EIS consider alternatives outside the jurisdiction of the preparing agency is significant because it recognizes that environmental problems transcend the sometimes artificial jurisdictional lines of agencies and
emphasizes that the CEQ believes these lines must be ignored
in combatting environmental harm. Furthermore, section
1502.14(d) provides that an agency must include the "no action"
alternative in the EIS; while an agency may have almost completely abandoned the "no action" alternative in the earliest
· stages of project development, it is important to reassess the wisdom of proceeding when more facts are available.
A particularly significant requirement is that preparers of an
EIS include environmental mitigation measures. Previously,
when a proposed action or alternative was developed, it may
have ignored mitigation measures because those who formulated
the alternative lacked familiarity with environmental matters
and means of minimizing environmental harm. 82
While the comprehensive study of alternatives is a laudable
goal, several of the specific requirements in the guidelines are
subject to criticism. Initially, the requirement that agencies consider alternatives outside their own jurisdiction presents three
problems. The first is one of expertise; agency staffs cannot be
expected to adequately develop alternatives outside their jurisdiction because they lack familiarity with other agencies' capabilities. In extreme cases, the staff of one agency may be unaware of alternative methods utilized by other agencies. Though
other agencies can be solicited to develop and evaluate alternatives outside the preparing agency's jurisdiction, the former may
be uninterested in the project. 83 Such an agency may not make a
good faith effort to present the alternative completely and objectively, 84 and thus the information it supplies decisionmakers may
not provide a suitable basis for a reasoned decision.
Second, it appears that cooperating agencies are expected to
finance the development and assessment of an alternative
82
The inclusion of mitigation measures in the alternatives considered in an EIS may
have a significant impact upon the ultimate agency decision. See part IV A infra.
83
See R. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 5.
.. There is also some ambiguity concerning the rights and obligations of the agency
which is not primarily responsible for the EIS. It is unclear whether an agency is obligated to aid in the preparation of another agency's EIS or the responsibility a given
agency would have if a decisionmaker in another agency were to determine that an alternative to a proposed action which required involvement of the former agency were the
preferred alternative.
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outside the preparing agency's jurisdiction. 85 It is unrealistic to
view the federal government as a monolith. Agencies vie for resources from a limited pool, and are understandably reluctant to
expend any of those resources developing project proposals for
other agencies.
Third, this provision may meet with agency nullification.
Decisionmakers may be prejudiced against choosing a course of
action that would fall either primarily or wholly outside the jurisdiction of their agencies. The agency which originally conceives the project does so for specific reasons, including anticipated increase in prestige, desire to please constitutents, and
personal interest of the agency staff or leaders. The agency is not
likely to surrender jurisdiction over a project to another agency
when it has a stake in completing that project itself.
There is also a question of whether requiring the "no action"
alternative is merely a paper concession to environmentalists,
because that alternative may never be chosen. As noted above,
once an agency decides to proceed with the planning of a project
it has, in all likelihood, ruled out the no action alternative.
Moreover, once a selection of alternatives has reached the decisionmaker's hands, not only an EIS, but many other information
and planning documents, have been produced, at great cost to
the agency. Abandoning a project at this stage would constitute
a significant financial loss. 88
Finally, section 1502.14(e), regarding the identification of the
agency's preferred alternative, is subject to three criticisms.
First, it is somewhat impractical. If the EIS is to be prepared as
part of a decisionmaking process, the agency's final determination cannot be identified therein. There is little chance of determining what the "agency's" preferred alternative is at a static
point because decisionmakers' dispositions could be changing
continuously. Second, identifying a preferred alternative in the
EIS cannot further the objectives of NEPA. At that point, the
EIS has not been considered by the decisionmaker; before the
EIS is considered, the preferred alternative is irrelevant to its
content. Third, singling out a specific "preferred" alternative
may influence the decisionmaker's choice. If this subpart is
merely aimed at indicating to the public which of the alternatives considered in the EIS is the originally proposed action, the
.. 40 C:-F.R. § 1501.6(b)(5) (1979) provides that a cooperating agency shall "[n]ormally
use its own funds." At least in the case of an agency which has jurisdiction by law over a
proposed action, participation as a cooperating agency is required upon request of the
lead agency. Id. § 1501.6.
81 See notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra.
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language of the provision should be clarified.
There is a general drawback of section 1502.14, though it does
not vitiate the need for a thorough consideration of alternatives.
The regulations are ambiguous as to what constitutes a wholly
distinct alternative and what constitutes a variation of another
alternative. Agencies are called upon to develop, explore, and
evaluate "all reasonable alternatives" to a proposed action. This
could place a severe burden on an agency in terms of time and
money. For this reason, many courts have demonstrated flexibility in reviewing agencies' selection of alternatives. 87 A solution to this problem is to require that agencies initially make a
good faith effort to research a reasonable range of alternatives
rather than all possible alternatives. 88 A decisionmaker could
then require a closer analysis of the alternatives within that part
of the spectrum presented in which he or she is most interested.
Despite this criticism, section 1502.14 is a vital requirement and,
if followed, should play a major role in assuring that decisionmakers have the greatest possible amount of environmental
information available.

C.

Unavailable and Incomplete Information

Even when all relevant information is available, predictions in
EIS's may be little more than "informed guesswork." 89 Behavioral political scientists are concerned that federal decisionmakers often fail to take proper account of uncertainty. 90
87
See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225,232 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 967 (1976) (HUD need only consider alternatives in site
selection, not manner of accomplishing objective); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 60
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975) (HUD need not consider alternatives
suggested by members of public); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe,
487 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1973) (alternatives with substantially equivalent environmental effects may be discussed in a limited fashion); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d
460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (EIS need not consider alternatives whose effect cannot reasonably be ascertained or whose implementation is remote or
speculative.).
88
See E. DoLGIN & T. GUILBERT, supra note 1, at 387.
•• Id. at 384. Three characteristics of NEPA contribute to this uncertainty. Generally,
although early preparation of the EIS is essential if the statement is to play the desired
role in the decisionmaking process, the greater the time lapse between the preparation of
the EIS and the commencement of work on the project the more speculative its contents.
More specifically, when an EIS is prepared for a project that is the first of its kind, it is
unlikely that any degree of thoroughness can reduce the high degree of speculation. Finally, while "programmatic" EIS's, which evaluate the enviromental effects of broad government programs are important to agency environmental planning, the information
they contain is, by design, less specific and comprehensive than the information in an
EIS evaluating the impacts of a specific project.
'° See J. KRuTILLA & A. FISHER, Tm: ECONOMICS Or NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 39 (1975).
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This is a special concern in the environmental field where technology is still in a relatively primitive stage.
While NEPA's delineation of what an EIS must contain is at
best imprecise, the statute completely overlooks the possibility
that potentially relevant information may be unavailable or costprohibitive. Despite Congress' failure to address this problem in
the statute, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress
was well aware that man's understanding of the environmental
impacts of his actions is limited. 91
Judicial reaction to the problem of information gaps in EIS's
initially seemed inconsistent with other NEPA decisions. 92 The
court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers
(Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway), 93 however, set the tone for
_consistent responses to the problem. The court there held that
the Army Corps of Engineers was not required to launch a massive research effort for the sake of complying with NEPA, stating
that such an undertaking would be beyond the scope of an EIS. 94
Later cases have suggested two justifications for permitting an
EIS merely to acknowledge gaps in its data. First, unavailability
of information should not bring the wheels of government grinding to a halt. In County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interfor, 95
the court stated that as long as federal agencies indicate that the
presentation of certain information has been deferred they are
not required fo engage in "crystal ball" speculation and that uncertainty regarding environmental information cannot, by itself,
forestall government action. 96
See SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLAcr OF 1969, S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969); F. ANDERSON, supra
note 5, at 256-57.
12 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Cossatot River), 325 F.
Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971), Judge Eisele remanded the EIS to the Corps of Engineers to
ascertain information excluded from ·the original EIS. When faced with obvious errors in
the updated EIS upon rehearing, however, he held the EIS adequate because the errors
were not included intentionally, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Cossatot River), injunction vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211,
1214 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
" 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (EIS challenged by environmental group held
adequate when viewed as a whole).
" Id. at 938-39.
" 562 F.2d. 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (EIS prepared by
Secretary of Interior for leasing of federally owned outer continental shelf for oil and gas
exploration held adequate).
" Id. at 1378. The court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1975) (EIS on dumping of polluted dredged spoil in Long Island Sound held
inadequate because of failure to discover cumulative impact of dumping projects) agreed.
The court stated, "A government agency cannot be expected to wait until a perfect solution of environmental consequences of a proposed action is devised before preparing and
circulating an EIS." Id. at 88.
11
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Another justification for permitting an EIS to acknowledge a
gap in data is that it may be feasible to obtain the necessary
information at a later point. In Sierra Club v. Morton 97 the court
approved the Departrhent of Interior's postponing detailed research into the hazai-ds of geological conditions on the ocean
floor until after granting oil and gas leases because the agency
would retain control of the project. The court found the EIS reasonable as a whole without this information. 98 Similarly, in Suffolk County 99 the co~rt considered whether it was "meaningfully
possible" to develop the missing information at a later stage. too
Thus, while Sierra Club v. Morton and Suffolk County are careful to note that information may be omitted from an EIS only
when the potential danger from such an omission will be considered at a later date, Suffolk County and NRDC v. Calaway
strongly state that federal agencies need not be frozen in their
tracks because information required by NEPA is unavailable,
and that other national policy objectives can override an
agency's inability to obtain environmental information in deciding whether to proceed with a proposed action. tot
CEQ has heeded these cases and included a provision in the
guidelines aimed at ensuring that the decisionmaker is aware
" 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 827-28. The rule of reason was originally applied as a standard for EIS review
in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir.
1972). While the courts have acknowledged that filing supplemental statements will constitute compliance with NEPA, not all courts have gone as far as Sierra Club v. Morton.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C.
1972), the court held on remand that supplementary statements were inadmissable in a
case considering the adequacy of an EIS if they were circulated among the agencies and
were considered after the final decision. to go ahead with the project had been made.
Accord, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 91-92 (2d Cir.
1975).
Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton are not necessarily
inconsistent. It appears implicit in Sierra Club's approval of supplemental statements
that such statements be allowed only when the action in question can be stopped or
environmental harm avoided after additional information is filed. But see Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), where the court
refused to enjoin the construction of sewage treatment facilities while ordering the preparation of a supplemental EIS concerning the impact the facilities would have on shellfish.
See also notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra.
" 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977).
100
Id. at 1378. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d
79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
1 1
• Courts have been particularly amenable to this suggestion in cases where information is not available at the time the original statement is prepared. See Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (fact that information on effect of sewage treatment facilities on shellfish was not available at time EIS was
issued did not render it inadequate).
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that possibly relevant information has not been included in the
statement. Entitled "Incomplete or unavailable information,"
section 1502.22 182 provides that an agency shall indicate the gaps
which exist in the relevant information and the points at which
scientific uncertainty impinges upon the completeness or accuracy of the EIS. That section also provides for obtaining the
missing information if the cost of obtaining it is not disproportionate to its estimated value 103 or, if the cost is excessive, preparing a "worst case" analysis 104 indicating the worst environmental harm the project could cause and the probability of such
harm resulting. 105 By requiring such an analysis, the new guidelines have gone further than the authorities cited above. 106
Heretofore, agencies have been reluctant to abandon projects
on the basis of environmental costs identified in an EIS. 187 Because of its specificity, conspicuousness, and pessimism, the
"worst case" analysis could conceivably induce greater concern
with environmental protection on the part of decisionmakers.
Despite the fact that these analyses would be framed in terms of
probabilites, agencies may be less likely to take risks when the
possible adverse effects of their actions become part of a reviewable public record. 108 While Congress envisioned that NEPA
would make decisionmakers cognizant of the environmental
ramifications of their choices, it did not intend to inhibit them to
the point of foreclosing valuable agency action. Thus, the "worst
case" analysis could hinder decision making in ways unforeseen
by CEQ.
III.

PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

In its early years NEPA was often interpreted by the courts as
merely imposing a procedure for assessing the environmental
ramifications of agency action, 189 regardless of whether or not
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1979).
Id. § 1502.22(a).
UM Id. § 1502.22(b).
103
The requirement of an assessment of the probability that the worst case will occur
was added when comments on the draft guidelines expressed concern that an EIS which
included a worst case analysis would unduly highlight the often remote possibility of
adverse environmental consequences. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,984, col. 3 (1978), Comments to § 1502.22.
108
See notes 92-101 and accompanying text supra.
107
Hill & Ortolano, NEPA 's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial
Test, 18 NAT. REs. J. 285, 308 (1978).
108
See notes 181-213 and accompanying text infra.
109 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Gillman Dam), 325
F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (while acknowledging that it might be more, court
treated NEPA as an "environmental full discloure law").
1 2
•

103
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that assessment was used by decisionmakers. If the EIS is to
play a significant role in decisionmaking under the new guide.lines, however, execution of CEQ's procedural requirements
must take on greater significance. It is thus appropriate to examine some of the procedural provisions in the new guidelines
which attempt to guarantee that decisionmakers utilize the information in the EIS. This part will discuss three crucial procedural requirements of the new regulations: timing of the EIS,
forestalling of agency action until the EIS is filed, and interagency cooperation in the preparation of the EIS. It will also examine the secondary effects of the CEQ procedures.

A.

Timing

Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA provides that the EIS "shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
processes." 110 In addition, section 102(2)(H) states that federal
agencies shall "utilize ecological information in the planning and
development of research-oriented projects." 111 Both sections indicate that Congress anticipated that the EIS would be prepared
at an early stage of a project evaluation and would accompany a
proposal through agency decisionmaking channels. 112 Commentators have construed NEPA as imposing two general obligations
on federal agencies: full disclosure concerning the environmental
impact of proposed actions and balanced decisionmaking. 113 The
proper parties must get the proper information at the proper
time so that these obligations can be fulfilled....
.
Unfortunately, EIS's have had "little relation to actual decisionmaking on location, design, construction, and operation of
the endeavor being studied." 115 This result is due in part to the
fact that EIS's have invariably taken a long time to prepare and
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
NEPA, § 102(2){H), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1976) (emphasis added). It is arguable
that this subsection does not require such information to be in an EIS. When an EIS is
prepared, however, other forms of enviromental assessment are customarily foregone.
Thus, the information comtemplated by § 102(2)(H) will usually come to a decisionmaker via the EIS. See also Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the
Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. REs. J. 339 (1976).
'" See W. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 767 (1977) (NEPA's "purpose is to require
consideration of environmental factors before project momentum is inesistable, before
options are closed, and before agency commitments are set in concrete.").
"' D'Amato & Baxter, The Impact of Impact Statements Upon Agency Responsibility:
A Prescriptive Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REv. 195, 198 (1976).
'" Id. at 199.
11
• Friesma & Culhane, supra note 111, at 339. In its 1976 REPORT, CEQ also concluded
that existing training programs ignored the value of the EIS in decisionmaking. 1976
REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
11

•

111
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often are not completed until decisions have in fact been made;
the statements then become instruments for justifying rather
than assessing projects. Tl}is use of EIS's is not only contrary to
the statutory language but is also wasteful since it does not
heighten the government's responsiveness to environmental
threats. To remedy this problem, the CEQ promulgated section
1502.5, 116 which provides that "an agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible
to the time the agency is presented with a proposal . . . so that
preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to
be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal." 117
This requirement of early preparation of the EIS is crucial to the
effectiveness of the Act.
Several courts have clearly mandated preparation of the EIS
as early as possible. 118 There are, however, objections to this
practice. First, the earlier the EIS is prepared the more likely it
is to contain errors and speculative data. 119 Second, CEQ envisions EIS's which include information on costs and benefits unrelated to purely environmental matters, 120 which calls for work
by staff members other than those involved in the development
of environmental data. Including and evaluating such non-environmental information in an EIS depends on its timely development by these other staff members, and thus, the filing of the
EIS may be retarded. Staff members responsible for preparing
the EIS have not, in the past, been forced to coordinate their
efforts with those performing other functions within the agency.
Precise coordination, therefore, may be a practical impossibility.
· Coordinating the preparation of environmental and non-environmental information so that both can be included in the EIS is
of questionable value. The ultimate responsibility for balancing
information lies not with the staff members who prepare an EIS
but with the decisionmaker. Rather than imposing excessive pro40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1979).
"' Id.
118 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d.
1109, 1119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 256 (W.D. Wash. 1972);
Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
111
E. DoLGJN & T. CUILBERT, supra note 1, at 384. One court has pointed out that
impact statements must be prepared "late enough in the (project] development process
to contain meaningful information." Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n., 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agencies must set forth
reasons when choosing not to prepare an EIS at a particular stage of program development in order to facilitate judicial review of that decision).
12• 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(b) (1979) states that an EIS shall include a discussion of the
indirect environmental effects of a proposed action and alternatives. "Effects" are defined as including aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, and social impacts. Id. § 1508.8.
Ill
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cedural hurdles on agencies the EIS should be limited to environmental assessment. In this form, the document can "serve
practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking
process. " 121
The regulations leave the exact timing of an EIS to agency
discretion. 122 Section 1501.8 establishes procedures for setting exact time limits for EIS preparation and contains a non-exhaustive list of considerations which may enter into that determination, including potential for environmental harm, the size of the
proposed action, the state of the art of analytic techniques, and
the consequences of delay. 123 Other factors that have been proposed include the amount of information needed, whether there
is a sound basis for the decision prior to preparing the EIS,
whether there is a preconceived bias on the part of decisionmakers, and whether there is adequate extra-agency
participation. 12•

B.

Forestalled Action

When the environmental costs of a project are not properly assessed before detailed planning or work on a project proceeds,
two problems commonly jeopardize the goal of environmental
preservation. The first is the use ·of the "sunk cost" justification
by agencies. 125 When an agency assumes that it will proceed with
a proposal and invests resources in the project, the cost of abandoning that project becomes greater. Thus, for example, while a
cost-benefit analysis of the project might demonstrate that the
proposal should not be adopted when no work has been done, the
inclusion of the agency's analysis expenditures as part of the project cost may tip the balance in favor of continuing the project. 128
The court in Keith v. Volpe 121 foreclosed any possible use of
the sunk cost argument by the state of California. Despite the
defendant's admission that land purchased for highway construction might have to be resold if the project were abandoned,
the court refused to approve the continued acquisition of land for
the project, believing that the more the state government spent
"' Id. § 1502.5.
112
Id. § 1501.8.
1
" Id. § 1501.8(b)(l).
iu Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 EcoL. L.Q. 799, 817 (1973).
in Friesma & Culhane, supra note 111, at 347.
121
See E. DOI.GIN & T. GUILBERT, supra pote 1, at 385.
in 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (state's purchasing of parcels of land for highway
enjoined pending preparation of acceptable EIS).
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on the project the harder it would be to abandon, even if the
expenditures could be recouped. 128
The second problem that results when an agency commences
work without completing an environmental assessment is that
staff members develop greater allegiance to a particular alternative or the project in general as the project advances. Consequently, a complementary bias develops against any alternatives
to the proposed action or entirely different projects for which the
agency's resources might be utilized. 129
These two problems require that adequate EIS's be prepared
before any action is taken. Although the general problem of premature action has not arisen frequently in litigation, it has been
at issue in a few cases. The court in Arlington Coalition on
Transportation v. Volpe, 130 for example, enjoined a highway
transportation project pending the filing of an EIS. 131 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 132 the court stated that section
102(2) "makes the completion of an adequate research program a
prerequisite to agency action." 133
The new CEQ regulations 134 support their timing requirements
with a provision prohibiting any environmentally deleterious action 135 until the agency has issued a record of its decision explaining whether and why it will proceed with a particular project.'38 Section 1506.l(a) precludes agency action which will
either "have an adverse environmental impact," or "limit the
Id. at 1355. See also Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14 (D. Hawaii
1972) (acquisition of right of way enjoined pending preparation of acceptable EIS). Rodgers has described the problem of agencies proceeding on a project prior to the completion of an adequate EIS as one of "project momentum." W. RoDGERS, supra note 112, at
774.
1
" Comment, supra note 124, at 813.
130
458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
1 1
•
Id. at 1330.
132
325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D C. 1971) (injunction against Secretary of Agriculture to prevent use of pesticides in southern United States denied because department research program was adequate).
133
Id. at 1403. "The Act," the Hardin court continued, "envisions that program formulation will be directed by research results rather than that research programs will be
designed to substantiate programs already decided upon." Id. See also Greene County
Planning Board v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1972) (it was error for
Commission to conduct hearings on application for construction of high-voltage transmission line prior to filing of EIS); Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 16-17 (D.
Hawaii 1972) (construction, right of way acquisition, and expenditure for design of highway enjoined pending preparation of adequate EIS.)
1
"
40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 (1979).
1"' Id. § 1506.l(a) speaks of "action concerning the proposal." (emphasis added). Presumably, this provision applies to action directly related to the project such as construction and to ancillary actions such as clearing land which may cause environmental harm.
138 See part IV B infra.
1
"
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choice of reasonable alternatives," 137 before the agency issues the
record of decision. The agency must also promptly notify any
grant or license applicant who is known to be proceeding with
work on a project prior to the record of decision that any measures necessary to protect the environment will be taken, despite
the applicant's prior action. 138 Finally, proceeding with a project
that is a component of a larger project, and thus the subject of
an acceptable programmatic EIS, 139 is proscribed until the· record
of decision on the individual project is issued, 140 though the section permits preparatory action that does not affect the
environment. 141
Section 1506.l(d) does allow continued planning during the
NEPA process by non-federal applicants for government permits
or assistance. Such planning, though not directly conducted by
the agency preparing the EIS, may involve consulting with or
reporting to that agency. It could thus affect the attitudes of
decisionmakers and cause them to develop prejudices in favor of
the project as the original conception evolves into reality.
Section 1506.l(b) states that when an agency is aware that a
non-federal applicant is contemplating action, the "agency will
take appropriate action to insure that the objectives and procedures of NEPA are achieved." 142 In the context of section 1506.1,
this provision appears to require any environmental harm caused
by such an applicant to be rectified to the fullest extent possible.
The regulations, however, do not state who is to bear the cost of
necessary measures. In order to inhibit environmentally damaging action by private actors, either the guidelines or agency regulations143 should make clear that the responsible party, and not
the government, will bear the cost of any unwarranted injury to
the environment. It may also be advisable for agencies to condition the granting of licenses or acceptance of bids on the applicant's forebearance from harming the environment.
Enforcement of section 1506.l(b) may engender great costs to
the federal government. CEQ does not indicate what constitutes
'"' 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(a)(l), l(a)(2) (1979).
138
Id. § 1506.l(b).
"' A programmatic environmental impact statement is one that assesses the environmental effects of a related series of actions.
0
"
40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(c) (1979).
"' Id. § 1506.l(d). But see Stop H-3 Association v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 16-17 (D.
Hawaii 1972) (expenditure for design of highway enjoined pending preparation· of adequate EIS).
'" 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(b) (1979).
143
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1979), agencies are to promulgate any necessary
supplementary procedures.
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"appropriate action." It seems, however, that the agencies are
not empowered to require certain measures that might be appropriate to correct or mitigate environmental harm. Most agencies,
for example, could not find statutory authority for imposing fines
on private individuals who damage the environment. 144 The
agencies can exert some power over parties to whom they do
grant aid, a contract, or a permit. If, however, the value of that
which the government grants these parties is diminished by penalties commensurate with any environmental harm caused by
the recipient, the latter may withdraw the application and again
be beyond the jurisdiction of the agency. In addition, it is of little concern to the applicant if the agency itself incurs the cost of
remedying damage caused by an applicant. The loss of a government grant may serve as a deterrent to private parties damaging
the environment, but the manner in which such harm is to be
remedied once inflicted is a more significant and unclear
problem.
It is possible that by "appropriate action" in section 1506.l(b)
CEQ contemplates resort to the judicial process. The issue of
private action injurious to the environment prior to the government's completion of a necessary EIS was addressed in Silva v.
Romney. 145 In Silva, the district court enjoined the Department
of Housing and Urban Development from granting a private developer funds to proceed with the construction of a federally
funded housing project pending the preparation of an acceptable
EIS. 148 The district court did not, however, enjoin the private developer from cutting down trees. 147 The circuit court affirmed the
holding on the first point and, while not taking any definitive
action, stated that the district court had the power under NEPA
to enjoin the action of a private applicant for public funds and
remanded the case for consideration of that issue. 148 Preventing
'" The court in Gage v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 479 F.2d 1214, 1220 n.19 (D.C. Cir.
1973), stated, "Intervention to prevent environmental harm from private and non-federal
action . . . may very well go beyond [an agency's] organic power . . . . "
5
"
473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
'" 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972).
'" Id.
"' 473 F.2d at 288-90. The Court reasoned tha~ HUD was actually the benefactor of the
private developer and that the extensive nexus between the Department and the developer gave the district court jurisdiction to enjoin the private action. See also Gifford-Hill
& Co., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 389 F. Supp. 167, 174 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d
730 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (NEPA applies to actions by non-federal parties which have environmental impact and for which federal permission is required); Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972) (private recipient of HUD
grant enjoined from proceeding with demolition work until HUD had complied with
NEPA). But see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration enjoined from granting money to State of Virginia for construction pend-
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action in the private sector prior to the filing of the EIS, even by
resort to litigation, would be an important step in preserving the
environment.
Significantly, CEQ has attempted to define clearly the relationship between its forestalled action provision and programmatic EIS's. If this relationship remained unclear, components
of a proposed program could proceed despite the fact that the
program itself might be abandoned. Thus, action which might
not be required if an overall program· is ultimately abandoned
cannot, under section 1506.l(c), be taken independently of that
program.1 49 This section clearly expresses CEQ's intention that
the forestalled action provision apply not only to individual
projects, but also to more generalized federal programs that may
include any number of individual projects. 150
The forestalled action provision of section 1506.1 is one of the
vaguest in the new guidelines. The concept of "appropriate action to insure that the objectives and procedures of NEPA are
achieved" will have to be more precisely defined by each agency.
Only time will tell whether a definition can,_ be formulated which
helps agencies to effectuate CEQ's intention that private actors
not cause environmental harm pending the approval of a project
by a federal agency.
ing preparation of EIS, but state not enjoined from proceeding with construction of proposed penal facility).
"' 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(c) (1979) (emphasis added) provides that "agencies shall not
undertake . . . any major Federal action covered by [a program under assessment] which
may significantly affect the quality of the human environment unless such action: (1) [i]s
justified independently of the program; (2) [i]s itself accompanied by an adequate [EIS];
and (3) [w]ill not prejudice the ultimate decision on the program." See Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (an EIS need not be
prepared for every component project in a program if an alternative form of environmental assessment is performed). See also notes 125-28 and accompanying text supra.
150
It is also implicit in the prohibition of action before a record of decision has been
filed, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.l(a) (1979), that an agency should not proceed with a project that
is part of a program for which a programmatic EIS has not been completed. When an
individual project is part of a program, the program is normally approved prior to the
project. An individual project, however, may be small enough to pass even the strictest
scrutiny for adverse environmental consequences, while the program of which that project is a part might wreak environmental havoc. While § 1506.l(c) (3) guards against the
"sunk cost" argument, discussed in note 125 and accompaning text supra, by proscribing
action that will influence the ultimate decision on the program, that provision does not
guard against the possibility that the agency will fail altogether to prepare a programmatic EIS. It must be remembered that these guidelines are, in essence, a form of coercion to attain compliance with NEPA. Thus, CEQ should clarify that programmatic
EIS's must be prepared when the overall effect of a sufficiently related series of actions
will be environmentally adverse.
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Administrative Economy

Bureaucratic systems are commonly criticized for being inherently wasteful. Agencies have proven to be particularly vulnerable to this criticism in the preparation of EIS's, most often because they must develop information for an EIS that either does
not fall within-their areas of expertise, or has already been developed or is being developed contemporaneously by other
agencies. 151
CEQ has attempted to ameliorate this situation by providing
for cooperation among federal, state, and local governmental
agencies in developing data and preparing EIS's. First, the
guidelines set up procedures for establishing a hierarchy of
lead 152 and cooperating 153 agencies in the preparation of an EIS.
A federal agency, or at least one federal agency where there are
multiple lead agencies, must play the role of the lead agency, 154
while an arm of any governmental entity may perform the functions of a cooper a ting agency. 155
Second, sections 1506.2 158 and 1506.4 157 focus on a common feature of bureaucratic waste, unnecessary duplication of effort.
Section 1506.4 provides simply· that the EIS or any other environmental document "may be combined with any other agency
document to reduce duplication and paperwork." 158 Section
1506.2 is aimed at eliminating duplication of efforts by federal
agencies and state and local bodies by providing for joint planning, research, hearings, and environmental assessments when
such bodies are dealing with similar problems. 159
The emphasis on interagency cooperation, if implemented,
would help diminish bureaucratic waste. Overall expenditures
151
Federal agencies may not only duplicate the efforts of other federal agencies, but of
state and local bodies as well.
152 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5 (1979). This section outlines the process for selecting the lead
agency. Specific duties of the lead agency are set out throughout the regulations.
153
Id. § 1501.6. This part is the complement of § 1501.5.
llM Id. § 1501.5(b).
155
Id. § 1506.2(b).
1
.. Id. § 1506.2.
"' Id. § 1506.4.
,.. Presumably, this does not mean that environmental information can be so commingled with other data that the former is obscured. In Greene County Planning Board v.
Fed. Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), the court stated that a conglomeration of reports and testimony "cannot replace a single coherent and comprehensive environmental analysis . . . ."
158 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(h) (1979). CEQ envisions that adherence to this section shall "to
the fullest extent possible include joint environmental impact statements." Id. §
1506.2(c). These shall discuss, among other things, problems that may arise as a direct
result of problems or laws peculiar to the state or states involved. Id. § 1506.2(d).
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would be decreased because agencies would pool their resources.
Disputes among lead and cooperating agencies would, ideally, be
reconciled at the preparation stage rather than being raised for
the first time when agencies comment on the draft EIS. 160 Later
disagreement and unnecessary delay might be minimized because the division of assignments would have been made by all
participating agencies through the scoping process. 181 Furthermore, coordination of time, money, and intellectual resources of
every level of government would produce a better overall result
than would be achieved by separate efforts under the prevailing
practices. 182
It is uncertain, however, whether eliminating disjointed exercise of authority will lead to more rational consideration of environmental concerns in decisionmaking. It has been argued that
redundancy is instrumental in attaining reliable decisions. 183 The
leading proponent of this theory points out that while zero redundancy, i.e., eliminating all duplication of effort, has become
a benchmark of both economy and efficiency in decisionmaking,
it may actually be a great hindrance to the latter . 18'
This is a valid criticism of the doctrine of zero redundancy and
is particularly apposite in the NEPA context. Because the art of
1
'° See generally id. § 1506.10 concerning time period allotted for commenting on draft
EIS's.
111
Id. § 1501.6(b)(2). See notes 51-64 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of
the scoping process.
112
In the introductory materials to the new regulations, CEQ sets out its goals for the
new regulations in the following sequence: first, reducing paperwork; second, reducing
delay; and finally, better decisions. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, col. 1 (1978). This order might
convey an order of priorities; the order in which the purposes of the guidelines are set out
could certainly lead one to believe that CEQ adheres to the traditional agency position
that NEPA's procedural requirements are of greater importance than its substantive
mandates. In the case of the sections concerning administrative economy, CEQ may have
. failed to see the forest-better decisions-for its obsession with the trees-reducing duplication of effort.
An alternative view is that CEQ is attempting to mask its actual intent. President
Carter's Exec. Order No. 11,991 emphasized that the new regulations are to implement
the procedural provisions of NEPA. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977). CEQ has arguably gone
beyond this mandate and produced a set of regulations that will affect substantive actions of federal decisionmakers.
113
Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29
PUB. Ao. REv. 346 (1969), reprinted in BUREAUCRATIC PoWER IN NATIONAL PoLmcs 337 (2d
ed. F. Rourke 1972).
1
" Id. at 339. The author states: "[R]edundancy is e powerful device for the suppression of error." Id. at 340. A famous study by Von Neumann originally advanced the theory that a decisionmaking organization can be more reliable than any one of its component parts by including sufficient duplication of efforts. Von Neumann, Probablistic
Logic and the Synthesis of Reliable Organizations from Unreliable Components, reprinted in AUTOMATA STUDIES (C.E. Shannon & J. McCarthy eds. 1956). Landau goes on
to cite instances where a lack of redundancy has resulted in costly errors in decisionmeking. Landau, supra note 163, at 344.
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environmental assessment is less developed than many other sciences, placing ultimate confidence in a single study may be imprudent. Duplicative efforts could well reveal errors or differences of opinion of which decisionmakers would otherwise be
unaware. The zero redundancy theory may not be a practical solution to current bureaucratic ills. A compromise aimed at decreasing bureaucratic waste, without a corresponding decrease in
the accuracy and comprehensiveness of decisionmaking aids
such as the EIS, would be preferable to the absolute approach
taken by CEQ in the new regulations.
D.

Secondary Effects of the Procedural Provisions

In addition to their direct effects, the procedural provisions
could have a secondary impact which would profoundly affect
agency decisionmaking. The provisions establish a uniform basis
for NEPA compliance. The advantages of this change are threefold. First, although agencies have heretofore promulgated their
own regulations pursuant to NEPA 165 and thus standardized
their own EIS's, when all EIS's are prepared in a similar manner, members of Congress, reviewing courts, the public, and officials of agencies other than the preparing agency or agencies will
find them easier to read and understand. Second, the extensive
cooperation among agencies provided for in the new regulations
will be facilitated if parallel procedures are followed by agencies
collaborating on a single EIS. Finally, the uniformity of the process from project to project will enable agency staffs to develop
expertise in the preparation of EIS's, simultaneously expediting
the preparation and improving the quality of the EIS's.
IV.

REQUIREMENTS

AFTER

THE

EIS

IS PREPARED

In addition to provisions aimed at transforming the EIS into a
valuable tool for agency decisionmakers, the new guidelines include post-EIS measures which further ensure that the policies
set out in sections 101 and 102(1) of NEPA are carried out by
federal agencies. Two such significant measures are the requirements that methods for mitigating the adverse environmental
consequences of an agency project be developed and that a concise "record of decision" be published after the final agency determination on a project requiring an EIS has been made.
11
• Under 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3 (1979), each agency must also adopt any procedures necessary to supplement the new guidelines.
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Mitigation of Environmental Harm

One might infer from NEPA that agencies are obliged, under
the Act, to minimize damage to the environment. In the policy
declaration of section 101(a) 188 the Act states that the federal
government is to "use all practicable means and measures . . .
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans." 187 In no other section, however, does the Act refer to
mitigation. There is little available data as to whether agencies
have actually taken it upon themselves to mitigate environmental harm in projects in which it would be appropriate to do so.
The goal of mitigating environmental damage did not originate with CEQ. Both commentators 188 and courts 189 have stated
that an EIS should discuss measures for minimizing harm to the
environment. A few courts have held that agencies are responsible for mitigating environmental damage in particular situations, though they have not based this conclusion on the statutory language quoted above. In Akers v. Resor, 170 for example,
the court found that a Corps of Engineers' decision to proceed
with a stream channelization project was improper under the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 171 because the Corps
failed to establish measures of mitigation mandated by NEPA. 172
Resor raises the question whether Congress contemplated, and
the new guidelines establish, a duty to mitigate environmental
harm. One district court has answered this question in the affirmative. In Gillham Dam, 173 the court viewed NEPA as evidence of congressional intent to "create a duty on the part of
federal agencies to prevent or minimize unjustifiable environmental degradation resulting from their activities." 174
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976),
"' Id. (emphasis added).
'" See, e.g., D'Amato & Baxter, supra note 113, at 198.
"' See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 824 (5th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited
v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 349 F. Supp.
1289, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1973), mod. & rem'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d
982 (5th Cir. 1974).
11
• 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
171
16 u.s.c. §§ 661-664 (1976).
172
The court reasoned that NEPA required the interpretation of the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act in accordance with NEPA. 339 F. Supp. at 1380.
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971), injunction dismissed, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. ), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (flood control project temporarily enjoined on
basis of inadequate EIS.)
"' Id. at 755.
Ill
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CEQ, however, does not make it clear that an agency has a
duty to mitigate harm. In section 1505.3, entitled "Implementing
the decision, " 175 the Council dictates that mitigation measures
shall be implemented if developed during the environmental
evaluation of the project and committed as part of the agency's
decision. Use of a conjunctive structure implies that agencies are
not necessarily required to adopt mitigation measures that are
included in alternatives considered in the EIS. 178 Similarly,
under section 1505.2(c), an agency is to "state whether all practicable measures to avoid or minimize environmental harm" have
been adopted, implying that the agency may have the power to
decline to adopt such methods.
In section 1505.3(b), however, CEQ has provided that lead
agencies shall "condition funding of actions on mitigation." 177
That language indicates that CEQ intends that mitigation measures be adopted as part of agency decisions. Moreover, the discussion in the EIS of each alternative and the proposed action
must, according to section 1502.14(f), "include appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed action or
alternatives." 178 If, as implied by section 1502.14, 178 agencies are
strictly limited to alternatives discussed in the EIS, their choice
would necessarily include the mitigation measures dictated by
section 1502.14(f). The agencies would, therefore, have a duty to
mitigate environmental harm.
Regardless of whether such a duty would be enforced by a
court, the fact that the EIS must focus on mitigation measures
can do a great deal to implement NEPA's policies. Agencies will
be forced to investigate avenues for minimizing environmental
degradation and to publish information about mitigation measures in EIS's. Decisions concerning which mitigation measures,
m 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1979).
171
See note 178 and accompanying text infra.
111
40 C.F.R. § 1505.3(b) (1979).
171
Id. § 1502.14(0 (1979). The provision in§ 1502.14(0 is reinforced by a similar provision in § 1502.16(h), which details the scientific and analytic bases for the comparisons
required under § 1502.14.
171
Id. § 1502.14 (1979) states that an EIS must provide "a clear basis for choice among
options by the decisionmaker and the public." Development and evaluation of alternatives with this end in mind can only indicate an intention that the decisionmaker must
choose one. If the. decisionmaker were free to choose an alternative not evaluated in the
EIS, the purpose of the Act and the regulations would clearly be circumvented.
Section 1505.l(e) requires only that the "alternatives considered by the decisionmaker
[be] encompassed by the range of alternatives discussed in the relevant environmental
documents." Id. § 1505.l(e). This arguably permits modification of any proposed alternative by the decisionmaker. It is equally arguable, however, that any attempt to eliminate
mitigation measures would remove an alternative from the "range of alternatives" considered in the EIS.

WINTER

New CEQ Regulations

1980]

399

if any, will be adopted should therefore be subject to more informed and extensive extra-agency scrutiny.

B.

Record of Decision

In order to facilitate judicial review of an agency decision
under the standards set forth in section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 180 the agency must develop a record setting forth all evidence considered in reaching that decision. With
limited exceptions 181 any document included in such a record· is
available to the public under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. 182· The EIS would be part of such a record, and
hence available to the public. The rationale for an agency's decision to proceed with or abandon a particular project after the
EIS has been considered, however, may not be so easily
accessible. ·
Public accountability for decisions is a common technique for
combatting institutional biases and identifying the bases of decisions. In a bold effort to assure adherence to NEPA's policies
and to facilitate participation by both the public and the courts
in achieving that goal, CEQ has required agencies to prepare a
"record of decision" for each decision which involves the preparation of an EIS.' 83 The record of decision must state the
agency's decision, 184 identify all alternatives considered, specify
the environmentally preferable alternative or alternatives, 185
180
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). Currently, the definitive statement of the standard of judicial review of administrative actions is the "substantial inquiry or hard look" test applied
by the United States Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971). In describing courts' obligations under the Overton Park test, the Court
stated that while review of agencies' factual determinations is to be "searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. [Nor is t]he court . . . empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id. at 416. NEPA litigation in which the
"hard look" test has been applied includes Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River), 486
F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th
Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Some courts have imposed a stricter, objective good faith standard on administrative
agencies when only the adequacy of an EIS is in question. See, e.g., National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
A possible rationale for such an approach is that agencies are not entitled to the same
deference in environmental matters as they are accorded, under the APA, in areas within
their expertise. See also E. DoLGIN & T. GUILBERT, supra note 1, at 312.
m Administrative Procedure Act, § 552 (b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
"' 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1976).
,a 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1979).
'"' Id. § 1505.2(a).
,.., In the draft guidelines the identification of the environmentally preferable alternative was to be made in the EIS itself, § 1502.14(e), 43 Fed. Reg. 25,237, col. 3 (1978).
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identify all factors, environmental and non-environmental, considered by agency decisionmakers, 188 and discuss the impact of
those factors on the ultimate decision. 187 In addition, the record
must state whether all practicable mitigation measures included
in the chosen alternative have been adopted, 188 explain why any
rejected mitigation measures have not been adopted, 189 and set
out the agency's planned monitoring and enforcement program
for any mitigation measures adopted. 190 Requiring a record of decision may be no more than a particularization of the traditional
requirement that an agency produce a record suitable. for review
by the courts. In Ely v. Velde 191 the court held that in addition to
satisfying the express mandate of NEPA the agency was obligated to "explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis and its
reasoning" 192 so that courts could independently evaluate
whether or not it has fulfilled its obligations under NEP A. 193
It has been argued that visibility promotes responsibility in
agencies' fulfillment of their statutory obligations. 194 The most
obvious advantage of the record of decision is that it resists
"closed door decisionmaking," the insulation of the agency from
all but select constituents concerned with its organic mission. 195
The new regulations prevent agencies from insulating themselves
and their decisions from scrutiny by those with different orientations. They enable outsiders to pressure an agency into taking
account of national policy goals not integrally related to the latter's statutory mission.
Opening the agency decisionmaking process to the public can
improve decisionmaking in two important ways. First, it facilitates a thorough airing of the issues. Since the record of decision
requirement forces articulation and explanation of agencies' decisions, public awareness will be heightened. This, in tum, will
open formerly closed channels of communication to the public, 198
181

40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1979).

,11 Id.

Id. § 1505.2 (c) (1979).
Id.
"• Id.
111 451 F. 2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (construction of penal facility ordered enjoined pending preparation of EIS).
112
Id. at 1139.
m Id. at 1138-39.
'" Wilson, The Study of Administration, ~POL.SCI. Q. 197, 213 (1887), reprinted in 56
PoL. Sci. Q. 481 (1941).
m Strobehn, supra note 32, at 103. Closed door decisionmaking would be inexcusable
under even the most conservative interpretation of NEPA, namely, that it is merely an
environmental disclosure law, since failure to publicize the contents of an EIS would
preclude disclosure of the environmental assessment.
'" Cramton & Berg, supra note 11, at 515.
181

181
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and should lead to more thoughtful and responsible decisionmaking.
Second, a record of decision will make it more difficult for
decisionmakers to obfuscate th~ bases of their decisions. This
should foster greater accountability to the general public and
hence greater sensitivity to their concerns. When an agency becomes responsive to a broader constituency, it also becomes sensitive to a wider range of political viewpoints. If agencies become
responsive to political input based on environmental concerns
their decisions will take greater account of environmental protection, which Congress has declared a national policy objective.
Many criticisms have been levelled against theories of open
decisionmaking in general and against CEQ's "record of decision" in particular.1 97 In the context of NEPA, this argument is
based on the fact that it may be "politically distasteful" to describe in detail how the integrity of the environment has been
sacrificed in favor of other policy concerns. 198 Admittedly, some
social impacts "are taboo subjects for written public .documents."199 Agencies are reluctant to highlight the role of status,
class, or culture in their decisions. Government decisions are
produced by the bureaucratic process, and, it is sometimes argued, the public is incapable of understanding how and why our
institutions sometimes fail to produce optimal results. 200
Federal agencies were particularly unhappy with the prospect
of identifying the environmentally preferable alternative,
whether in the EIS as the draft guidelines required, or in the
record of decision. 201 They felt that doing so would, in effect, es117

Comments of General Public, on file at Council of Environmental Quality, 722
Jackson Place, Washington, D.C. One government employee, expressing her personal
views, commented, "[I]t is probably unrealistic to expect a political appointee to publicly
air the rationale for a political decision." Letter to Nicholas C. Yost (Aug. 10, 1978), on
file at Council of Environmental Quality, 722 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C.
115
Comment, CEQ Proposes Ambitious NEPA Regulations for Comment, Stands
Ground Despite Agency Criticism, (1978] 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10,129, 10,130.
'" Friesma & Culhane, supra note 111, at 3347-48. The authors remark, it is often a
"myth that [government] programs serve an undifferentiated public interest." Id. at 348.
200 Many theories have been advanced to explain the failure to reach optimal results.
No single theory emphasizes every fault of the system, and usually several are applicable
to one agency or even to the decision on a single project. See, e.g., the positivist model
based on pure rationality, SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1957), the incrementalist model, LINDBLOM, Tm: mTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DECISIONMAKING THROUGH
MvruAL AwusTMENT (1965), the mixed scanning approach, Etziani, Mixed Scanning: A
"Third" Approach to Decision-making, 27 Pua. AD REv. 385 (1967). See also W. GoRE,
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING (1964); D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF
DECISION (1963); P. WOLL, PUBLIC POLICY ch. 2 (1974); BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL
POLITICS (2d ed. F. Rourke 1972); READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, Part IV (2d
ed. R. Wolfinger 1970).
201
Comment, supra note 36, at 10,045.
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tablish a priority for environmental policies over others. 202 CEQ
responded that the record of decision and identification of the
environmentally preferable alternative require only an explication of the agency's choice, not an ultimate decision. 203 This position is reflected by a substantiai change in language between the
draft and final regulations. In the draft regulations agencies were
directed to state "their reasons why other specific con_siderations
of national policy overrode [the environmentally preferable] altematives."204 The final regulations soften this language by requiring an agency to "identify and discuss" all factors-contributing to the choice of one alternative over another "including any
essential considerations of national policy." 205 In changing this
language, CEQ has avoided forcing agencies to confront the
question of why the environmentally preferable alternative or alternatives were rejected.
The desirability of this result is questionable. NEPA was a response to the practice of cutting environmental comers in order
to achieve other types of ends; its aim is to achieve parity for
environmental values with other, more traditional, ones. Thus,
while emphasizing environmental concerns may appear to place
a premium on them, such emphasis may be necessary to achieve
the reorientation envisioned by Congress.
Another problem is that while the record of decision does not
transform the EIS into a decision document, 208 in practice it establishes a decision document that concentrates on environmental policy rather than national policy objectives in general.
NEPA dictates only the preparation of an information document, not a decision document. 207 In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 208 a leading NEPA case, the Court of
202 Id. at 10,046. This assertion is supported by the fact that no similar requirement
exists for identifying either the socially, culturally, economically, or technically preferable alternative.
203
Id.
204 Section 1505.2(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 25,240, col. 3 (June 9, 1978).
"'" 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1979).
"'" For the purpose of this article, the term "decision document" refers to a document
presenting the evidence considered by an agency, stating the policies which influenced
the decision, and explaining how the agency reached its conclusion in light of both the
evidence and those policies. Thus, a decision document focuses on the process of choice.
On the other hand, an "information document," such as an EIS, focuses on the process of
assessment. See generally E. DoLGIN & T. GUIIJ!ERT, supra note 1, at 443-44.
2117 NEPA, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
208 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The apparent purpose of the [EIS] is to aid
in the agency's own decisionmaking process . . . . "). But see Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the Eighth Circuit suggested that an EIS might serve as a decision document, stating that "[t]he agency must
also explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis and its reasoning." Id. at 351. Thus,
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Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that the Act does
not mandate the preparation of a decision document. Calvert
Cliffs' concerned the construction of a nuclear power plant which
was enjoined because the initial EIS was inadequate. Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Commission ultimately decided to approve the plant, which is presently in operation.
The danger of requiring what is essentially a decision document which concentrates on environmental concerns is that
nonenvironmental project justifications, such as economic, technical, social, and cultural considerations might be "swallowed
up." 209 Courts have, of course, required agencies to justify their
decisions somewhere in the official record. As noted above, the
court Ely v. Velde 210 stated that agencies cannot keep their
thought processes "under wraps." 211 There has been little indication, however, that courts interpret NEPA to require justification for an agency's decision in an EIS, 212 or under any NEPA
provision. Nevertheless, this is essentially what CEQ has done
by requiring a record of decision emphasizing environmental values in guidelines promulgated under NEPA. 213
The record of decision required by section 1505.2 constitutes a
radical departure from the traditional conception .of the role of
an EIS. President Carter ordered CEQ to promulgate regulations
to implement the procedural provisions of NEPA. 214 Nowhere
does NEPA require or suggest that any document other than an
EIS be prepared. Thus, to enforce section 1505.2, a court would
have to find (1) that the President can require agencies to perform duties beyond those imposed by a statute in order to implement that statute, and (2) that the record of decision is necessary to the implementation of NEPA's procedural provisions.
"the complete formal impact statement represents an accessible means for opening up
the agency decision-making process and subjecting it to critical evaluation by those outside the agency, including the public." Id. (citations omitted).
209
F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 255.
21
• 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
211
Id. at 1138. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346
(8th Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v.
Mitchell (Hanly I), 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Gilham Dam), 325 F. Supp. 728
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
212
But see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
21
• In its record of decision, an agency is free to include information not required by §
1505.2. By so doing, an agency can dull the impact of a record of decision which focuses
exclusively on environmental considerations.
211
Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
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CONCLUSION

CEQ's new regulations for the preparation of environmental
impact statements contain three significant types of provisions.
First, the regulations require that all substantive information
necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the environmental
effects of a proposed action and alternatives thereto be included
in the EIS. Second, the regulations establish procedures to ensure that the information in the EIS will be considered by decisionmakers. Finally, certain provisions of the new regulations are
aimed at furthering environmental protection once the EIS is
completed. Many provisions of the regulations merely restate
previously prevailing practices. Those which have been discussed
in this article are either innovative or especially signific:ant.
While these latter provisions pose some problems due to lack of
clarity and potential difficulties in implementation, on the whole
they should improve environmental impact statements, enable
decisionmakers to make better use of the statements, and foster
heightened awareness of environmental concern in federal decisionmaking. Thus, the regulations should help considerably in
implementing the policies articulated in NEPA over a decade
ago.

-David M. Lesser

